MILA Unlimited

Muslims Intent On Learning and Activism (MILA) is a community of Muslims, dedicated to collective action in the way of building, serving, and strengthening our communities through education and activism. This blog is a place for contributors to discuss issues they find relevant or important for the Muslim community.

Friday, November 03, 2006

Islam caught between ‘Talabanization’ and ‘Westoxicosis’

Abu Nimir
November 2, 2006
MILA Unlimited

Polemics about “clash of civilizations” aside, the western mind set has been preoccupied with Islam’s inability to conform to modernity. Enlightenment in the West lead to a secular polity, Islamic enlightenment on which the West has pinned its hopes in this sense is an anathema. Secular world view is the polar opposite to Islam. Sheikh Hakim Murad the British Islamic Scholar highlights the complexity of the current Islamic revival, “The Islamic revival and its attendant struggle is less like the eighteenth century in Europe and more like the sixteenth, the age of Luther”, when Europeans “devoted their efforts to finding in the words of the Bible a meaning for which they were prepared to live and die for”. Muslims today are in the throws of a similar revivalist movement. It is important that this be understood in Islamic terms and not seen with jaundiced eyes colored by “West-East encounters beginning with the first attempts by Christian thinkers to make sense of Islam, a religion they interpreted as a new form of Christian heresy”. If the West genuinely aims to understand Islam and seeks rapprochement with Muslims it must let Muslims find their own meaning.
Muslims today are caught between two unenviable choices; the anachronistic regressive doctrine of the Taliban’s and the ‘monoculturalization’ of the world characterized by the malignant charlatanry of the multinationals and western cultural elites seeking contextual homogeneity. This ‘Westoxicosis’ is a toxic state that seeks a world of wall to wall consumers reveling in the global Wall Mart Super Store. While its antithesis ‘Talibinazation’ is characterized by a pernicious culture of archaic zealotry.
Current state of fossilization in the Muslim World has relegated it to the backwaters of contemporary discourse. This Islamic regression is attributed by the West to Islam or a particular irrational exegesis of its sacred texts. Unfortunately this vector of Western thinking is clouded by over five centuries of colonial hegemony and does not represent the whole truth. The Islamic world’s nadir after a thousand years of splendor is not because of Islam but more likely because Muslims abandoned Islam as the primary contributor to their 'zeitgeist'.
Arnold Toynbee had suggested many years ago that when a dominant civilization comes in contact with a subservient civilization, the subservient civilization has two choices, to follow the path of 'Zealots' or become a 'Herodian'. The Zealots are doomed to failure; their actions are akin to fighting tanks and planes with bows and arrows. The 'Herodians' named after King Herod (73-4 BCE) the nominal ruler of the small middle eastern state under the Roman tutelage, are also doomed because they strive for nothing more, but to copy the dominant culture and copying at its very best can not be additive, it can only produce the object it is copying. The 'Herodian' does not offer humanity a new exemplar on which to anchor civilization into the future. Can Islam present a third way?
An essential endeavor, creative dissonance is fundamental to human development. If the collective human enterprise has to progress it must seek new direction. Unless we subscribe to Francis Fukuyama's view about "The End of History and the Last Man" and believe that in the current Western model man has achieved his penultimate state to ensure future survivability. In the current global milieu we have few uncharted roads that are readily discernable. We must support the Islamic world’s endeavor, as chaotic as it may seem to articulate this ‘third way’.
Seen through non western eyes the state of our ‘Global Union’ may be less sanguine than what it may seem. The "Western model" of consumerism, secularism and ‘corporatocracy’, in its current form irrespective of the intent of its 'founding fathers' is not a sustainable model for human consumption on a mass scale. No matter how we may sweaten it with the mantra of markets without borders, freedom without boundaries and democracy ala carte and cloak it in the mantle of globalization. This is not to reject every thing with a Western source code. Science for one is neither Western nor Eastern but an ocean in which many streams flow. Without question West’s contribution to the sciences in the last five hundred years has been unprecedented in human history. Islam if it has to find its own place in the world order must learn from the western experience but has to secure it in its own context. Civilizations develop as a continuum, a ladder on which you have to climb the first rung before going on to the next. Hellenistic thought added to Q'uranic world view lead to the Muslim era of science and splendor in the middle ages that subsequently contributed towards the European/Western Renaissance. The cycle may have come back full circle.
Any authentic effort that will help the Muslim World out of the current state of 'stagnation' will have to be rooted in 'Muslim history and ideology' other wise it perilously takes the path of the 'Herodian' or will fall prey to the ‘Zealot’, in both cases being doomed at its inception. If Muslims have to progress then they must go back to the oasis of their civilization and build on the fundamentals. If they believe they have a new paradigm to offer? They will have to find it after toiling over their texts and finding meaning not just for them but for the rest of the humanity. The West must provide the Muslim world with the space it needs, recognize legitimate attempts at revival and reform and avoid obscurantist efforts to undermine the process.
The manifestations of Islam’s current malaise are best understood by looking at its leaders with possibly very few exceptions the vast majority can be characterized by 'unenlightened authoritarianism' universally they epitomize King Herod’s benign neglect of their own populace and a reflexive subservience to their Western Masters. The malady afflicting the leaders however is the symptom and not the disease. The etiology of the pathology seems to be the intellectual and moral bankruptcy of the elites that have abandoned their tradition and seek solutions that merely aim to replicate someone else's splendor. They continue to exploit the majority of the populace at the expense of maintaining their privileged status. This has resulted in systems skewed towards self perpetuating the ruling class and marginalizing the majority by denying them educational and ultimately economic opportunities. The endgame is creation of a perpetual underclass of servants and mid level bureaucrats that spend their lifetime in servitude oiling their ‘masters’ machine.
In order to change the status quo ante, Islamic movements need to bring about a change in the fundamentals of prevalent thinking. A critical mass of the ‘enlightened elites’ will need to realize that the current system is non sustainable in near terms, an ultimately against their self interest. The movement needs to mobilize and educate the masses to help them regain their self respect and assist them in getting out of the morass of haplessness by presenting sustainable models of Islamic economic growth. An Islamic 'liberation theology' needs to be developed that will steer the Muslim world away from the ideological boondocks and into the ‘Promised Land’.
Q'uranic injunction to Muslims to be 'witnesses for humanity' of what is 'enjoined to be good…' puts a heavy burden on them to strive (Jihad) to seek "Gods will"(Shariah). A dynamic state of tension between the ‘absolute' and the ‘understood'. The whole idea of 'Dawah' (Invite) people to 'The Path' is an essential part of The Deen (Way of life). To ‘invite' is not a coercive process but an incumbent duty to present Islamic ethos to the world as an alternative archetype. Muslim ideologues do not seek a 'unipolar' world but recognize as the Q’uran enjoins "You are made into Nations and Tribes so that you may get to know each other…" God does not want a single path to prevail; Pluralism is a hallmark not the antithesis of Islam. At an individual level Muslims will not be in error if they follow the normative at a given time. The normative is what represents the consensus, plurality; not necessarily 100% but 80% of the views held by scholars/learned men/women of 'the time'. It is by following fringe movements that ‘Talbinization’ becomes a predicament and it is by divorcing from Islam that ‘Westoxicosis’ becomes a malady.
When Islamists says: "Islam is the answer" this is what they mean. The West must develop a mindset that accepts the positive forces that Islam can unleash and if nurtured instead of hindered would be a windfall to humanity. Those of us who live in the West get bound to the prevailing logic, while touting the merits of pluralistic societies we are unable to sometimes see that what we seek is not pluralism but merely clones of ourselves. What is good for the 'goose' may not be good for the 'gander' and is unlikely to be good for communal harmony in the twenty-first century.

Wednesday, October 25, 2006

End the Silence Over Chechnya
By Václav Havel, Prince Hassan bin Talal, George Soros, André Glücksmann, Karel Schwarzenberg, Frederik Willem de Klerk, Mary Robinson, Yohei Sasakawa, and Desmond Tutu.

The Project Syndicate
It is extremely difficult for an honest observer to break through the closed doors that separate Chechnya from the rest of the world. Indeed, no one even knows how many civilian casualties there have been in ten years of war.

According to estimates by non-governmental organizations, the figure is between 100,000 (that is, one civilian out of ten) and 300,000 (one out of four). How many voters participated in the November 2005 elections? Between 60 and 80%, according to Russian authorities; around 20%, reckon independent observers. The blackout imposed on Chechnya prevents any precise assessment of the devastating effects of a ruthless conflict.

But censorship cannot completely hide the horror. Under the world’s very eyes, a capital – Grozny, with 400,000 inhabitants – has been razed for the first time since Hitler’s 1944 punishment of Warsaw. Such inhumanity cannot plausibly be described as “anti-terrorism,” as Russian President Vladimir Putin insists. The Russian military leadership claims to be fighting against a party of 700 to 2,000 combatants. What would be said if the British government had bombed Belfast, or if the Spanish government bombed Bilbao, on the pretext of quelling the IRA or the ETA?

And yet the world remains silent in the face of the looting of Grozny and other Chechen towns and villages. Are Chechen women, children and all Chechen civilians less entitled to respect than the rest of mankind? Are they still considered human? Nothing can excuse the seeming indifference displayed by our worldwide silence.

In Chechnya, our basic morality is at stake. Must the world accept the rape of girls who were kidnapped by the occupying forces or their militias? Should we tolerate the murder of children and the abduction of boys to be tortured, broken, and sold back to their families, alive or dead? What about “filtration” camps, or “human firewood”? What about the villages exterminated to set an example? A few NGO’s and some brave Russian and Western reporters have witnessed countless crimes. So we cannot say “we did not know.”

Indeed, the fundamental principle of democracies and civilized states is at issue in Chechnya: civilians’ right to life, including the protection of innocents, widows, and orphans. International agreements and the United Nations Charter are as binding in Chechnya as anywhere else. The right of nations to self-determination does not imply the right of rulers to dispose of their people.

The fight against terrorism is also at stake. Who has not yet realized that the Russian army is actually behaving like a group of pyromaniac firefighters, fanning the fires of terrorism through its behavior? After ten years of a large-scale repression, the fire, far from going out, is spreading, crossing borders, setting Northern Caucasus ablaze and making combatants even more fierce.

How much longer can we ignore the fact that, in raising the bogeyman of “Chechen terrorism,” the Russian government is suppressing the liberties gained when the Soviet empire collapsed? The Chechen war both masks and motivates the reestablishment of centralized power in Russia – bringing the media back under state control, passing laws against NGO’s, and reinforcing the “vertical line of power” – leaving no institutions and authorities able to challenge or limit the Kremlin. War, it seems, is hiding a return to autocracy.

Sadly, wars in Chechnya have been going on for 300 years. They were savage colonial conflicts under the Czar and almost genocidal under Stalin, who deported the whole Chechen population, a third of which perished during their transfer to the Gulag.

Because we reject colonial and exterminating ventures, because we love Russian culture and believe that Russia can bloom in a democratic future, and because we believe that terrorism – whether by stateless groups or state armies ­– should be condemned, we demand that the world’s blackout on the Chechen issue must end. We must help Russia’s authorities escape from the trap they set for themselves and into which they fell, putting not only Chechens and Russians, but the world at risk.

It would be tragic if, during the G8 summit scheduled for St. Petersburg, Russia, in June 2006, the Chechen issue were pushed to the side. This dreadful and endless war needs to be discussed openly if it is to end peacefully.

MIKE DAVIS

MIKE DAVIS
FEAR AND MONEY IN DUBAI
‘As your jet starts its descent, you are glued to your window. The scene below is astonishing: a 24-square-mile archipelago of coral-coloured islands in the shape of an almost-finished puzzle of the world. In the shallow green waters between continents, the sunken shapes of the Pyramids of Giza and the Roman Colosseum are clearly visible. In the distance, three other large island groups are configured as palms within crescents and planted with high-rise resorts, amusement parks and a thousand mansions built on stilts over the water. The ‘Palms’ are connected by causeways to a Miami-like beachfront crammed with mega-hotels, apartment skyscrapers and yachting marinas.
‘As the plane slowly banks toward the desert mainland, you gasp at the even more improbable vision ahead. Out of a chrome forest of skyscrapers soars a new Tower of Babel. It is an impossible half-mile high: taller than the Empire State Building stacked on top of itself. You are still rubbing your eyes with wonderment as the plane lands and you are welcomed into an airport shopping emporium where seductive goods entice: Gucci bags, Cartier watches and one-kilogram bars of solid gold. The hotel driver is waiting for you in a Rolls Royce Silver Seraph. Friends had recommended the Armani Inn in the 170-storey tower, or the 7-star hotel with an atrium so huge that the Statue of Liberty would fit inside it, and service so exclusive that the rooms come with personal butlers; but instead you have opted to fulfill a childhood fantasy. You always have wanted to play Captain Nemo in Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea.
‘Your jellyfish-shaped hotel, the Hydropolis, is, in fact, exactly 66 feet below the surface of the sea. Each of its 220 luxury suites has clear plexiglass walls that provide spectacular views of passing mermaids and of the famed ‘underwater fireworks’: a hallucinatory exhibition of ‘water bubbles, swirled sand and carefully deployed lighting’. Any initial anxiety about the safety of your sea-bottom resort is dispelled by the smiling concierge. The structure has a multi-level fail-safe security system which includes protection against terrorist submarines as well as missiles and aircraft.
‘Although you have an important business meeting at Internet City with clients from Hyderabad and Taipei, you have arrived a day early to treat yourself to one of the famed adventures at the ‘Restless Planet’ themepark. After a soothing night’s sleep under the sea, you board a monorail for this Jurassic jungle. Your first encounter is with some peacefully grazing brontosaurs. Next you are attacked by a flock of velociraptors, the animatronic beasts—designed by experts from the British Natural History Museum—so flawlessly lifelike that you shriek in fear and delight. With your adrenaline pumped up by this close call, you round off the afternoon with some snowboarding on the local indoor snow mountain (outdoors, the temperature is 105°). Nearby is the world’s largest mall—the altar of the city’s famed Shopping Festival, which attracts millions of frenetic consumers each January—but you postpone the temptation. Instead, you indulge in some expensive Thai fusion cuisine. The gorgeous Russian blonde at the restaurant bar stares at you with vampirish hunger, and you wonder whether the local sin is as extravagant as the shopping . . . ’
Fantasy levitated
Welcome to a strange paradise. But where are you? Is this a new Margaret Atwood novel, Philip K. Dick’s unpublished sequel to Blade Runner or Donald Trump on acid? No. It is the Persian Gulf city-state of Dubai in 2010. After Shanghai (current population 15 million), Dubai (current population 1.5 million) is the planet’s biggest building site: an emerging dreamworld of conspicuous consumption and what the locals boast as ‘supreme lifestyles’. Despite its blast-furnace climate (on typical 120° summer days, the swankier hotels refrigerate their swimming pools) and edge-of-the-war-zone location, Dubai confidently predicts that its enchanted forest of 600 skyscrapers and malls will attract 15 million overseas visitors a year by 2010, three times as many as New York City. Emirates Airlines has placed a staggering $37-billion order for new Boeings and Airbuses to fly these tourists in and out of Dubai’s new global air hub, the vast Jebel Ali airport. [1] Indeed, thanks to a dying planet’s terminal addiction to Arabian oil, this former fishing village and smugglers’ cove proposes to become one of the world capitals of the 21st century. Favouring diamonds over rhinestones, Dubai has already surpassed that other desert arcade of capitalist desire, Las Vegas, both in sheer scale of spectacle and the profligate consumption of water and power. [2]
Dozens of outlandish mega-projects—including the artificial ‘island world’ (where Rod Stewart has reportedly spent $33 million to buy ‘Britain’), the earth’s tallest building (Burj Dubai, designed by Skidmore, Owings & Merrill), the underwater luxury hotel, the carnivorous dinosaurs, the domed ski resort and the hyper-mall—are already under construction or about to leave the drawing board. [3] The 7-star hotel, the spinnaker-shaped Burj Al-Arab—looking much like the set of a James Bond film—is already world-famous for its $5,000 per-night rooms with 100-mile views and an exclusive clientele of Arab royalty, English rock stars and Russian billionaires. And the dinosaurs, according to the finance director of the Natural History Museum, ‘will have the full stamp of authority of the Museum in London, and will demonstrate that education and science can be fun’; and profitable, since the ‘only way into the dinosaur park will be through the shopping mall’. [4]
The biggest project, Dubailand, represents a vertiginous new stage in fantasy environments. Literally a ‘themepark of themeparks’, it will be more than twice the size of Disney World and employ 300,000 workers who, in turn, will entertain 15 million visitors per year (each spending a minimum of $100 per day, not including accommodation). Like a surrealist encyclopaedia, its 45 major ‘world class’ projects include replicas of the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, the Taj Mahal and the Pyramids, [5] as well as a snow mountain with ski lifts and polar bears, a centre for ‘extreme sports’, a Nubian village, ‘Eco-Tourism World’, a vast Andalusian spa and wellness complex, golf courses, autodromes, race tracks, ‘Giants’ World’, ‘Fantasia’, the largest zoo in the Middle East, several new 5-star hotels, a modern art gallery and the Mall of Arabia. [6]
Gigantism
Under the enlightened despotism of its Emir and ceo, 58-year-old Sheikh Mohammed al-Maktoum, Dubai has become the new global icon of imagineered urbanism. Multi-billionaire Sheikh Mo—as he is known to Dubai’s expats—has a straightforward if immodest goal: ‘I want to be Number One in the world’. [7] Although he is an ardent collector of thoroughbreds (the world’s largest stable) and super-yachts (the 525-foot-long ‘Project Platinum’, which has its own submarine and flight deck), his consuming passion is over-the-top, monumental architecture. [8] Indeed, he seems to have imprinted Scott and Venturi’s bible of hyper-reality, Learning From Las Vegas, in the same way that pious Muslims memorize the Qur’an. One of his proudest achievements, he often tells visitors, is to have introduced gated communities to Arabia, the land of nomads and tents.
Thanks to his boundless enthusiasm for concrete and steel, the coastal desert has become a huge circuit board upon which the elite of transnational engineering firms and retail developers are invited to plug in high-tech clusters, entertainment zones, artificial islands, glass-domed ‘snow mountains’, Truman Show suburbs, cities within cities—whatever is big enough to be seen from space and bursting with architectural steroids. The result is not a hybrid but an eerie chimera: a promiscuous coupling of all the cyclopean fantasies of Barnum, Eiffel, Disney, Spielberg, Jon Jerde, Steve Wynn and Skidmore, Owings & Merrill. Although compared variously to Las Vegas, Manhattan, Orlando, Monaco and Singapore, the sheikhdom is more like their collective summation and mythologization: a hallucinatory pastiche of the big, the bad and the ugly.
The same phantasmagoric but generic Lego blocks, of course, can be found in dozens of aspiring cities these days (including Dubai’s envious neighbours, the wealthy oil oases of Doha and Bahrain), [9] but al-Maktoum has a distinctive and inviolable criterion: everything must be ‘world class’, by which he means Number One in the Guinness Book of Records. Thus Dubai is building the world’s largest theme park, the biggest mall (and within it, the largest aquarium), the tallest building, the largest international airport, the biggest artificial island, the first sunken hotel and so on (see below). Although such architectural megalomania is eerily reminiscent of Albert Speer and his patron’s vision of imperial Berlin, it is not irrational. Having ‘learned from Las Vegas’, al-Maktoum understands that if Dubai wants to become the luxury-consumer paradise of the Middle East and South Asia (its officially defined ‘home market’ of 1.6 billion), it must ceaselessly strive for visual and environmental excess. If, as Rowan Moore has suggested, immense, psychotic assemblages of fantasy kitsch inspire vertigo, then al-Maktoum wants us to swoon. [10]
From a booster’s viewpoint, the city’s monstrous caricature of futurism is simply shrewd branding for the world market. As one developer told the Financial Times, ‘If there was no Burj Dubai, no Palm, no World, would anyone be speaking of Dubai today? You shouldn’t look at projects as crazy stand-alones. It’s part of building the brand’. [11] And its owners love it when architects and urbanists, like George Katodrytis, anoint it as the cutting edge:
Dubai is a prototype of the new post-global city, which creates appetites rather than solves problems . . If Rome was the ‘Eternal City’ and New York’s Manhattan the apotheosis of twentieth-century congested urbanism, then Dubai may be considered the emerging prototype for the 21st century: prosthetic and nomadic oases presented as isolated cities that extend out over the land and sea. [12]
In its exponential quest to conquer the architectural record-books, moreover, Dubai has only one real rival: China—a country that now has 300,000 millionaires and is predicted to become the world’s largest market for luxury goods (from Gucci to Mercedes) in a few years. [13] Starting from feudalism and peasant Maoism, respectively, both have arrived at the stage of hyper-capitalism through what Trotsky called the ‘dialectic of uneven and combined development’. As Baruch Knei-Paz writes in his admirable précis of Trotsky’s thought:
In appending new forms the backward society takes not their beginnings, nor the stages of their evolution, but the finished product itself. In fact it goes even further; it copies not the product as it exists in its countries of origin but its ‘ideal type’, and it is able to do so for the very reason that it is in a position to append instead of going through the process of development. This explains why the new forms, in a backward society, appear more perfected than in an advanced society where they are approximations only to the ‘ideal’ for having been arrived at piecemeal and with the framework of historical possibilities. [14]
In the cases of Dubai and China, all the arduous intermediate stages of commercial evolution have been telescoped or short-circuited to embrace the ‘perfected’ synthesis of shopping, entertainment and architectural spectacle, on the most pharaonic scale.
As a sweepstake in national pride—Arabs versus Chinese—this frantic quest for hyperbole is not of course, unprecedented; recall the famed competition between Britain and imperial Germany to build dreadnoughts in the early 1900s. But is it an economically sustainable strategy of development? The textbook answer is probably not. Architectural gigantism has always been a perverse symptom of economies in speculative overdrive, and each modern boom has left behind overweening skyscrapers, the Empire State Building or the former World Trade Center, as its tombstones. Cynics rightly point out that the hypertrophic real-estate markets in Dubai and urban China are the sinks for global excess profits—of oil and manufacturing exports, respectively—currently being pyramided by rich countries’ inability to reduce oil consumption and, in the case of the United States, to balance current accounts. If past business cycles are any guide, the end could be nigh and very messy. Yet, like the king of the enigmatic floating island of Laputa in Gulliver’s Travels, al-Maktoum believes that he has discovered the secret of eternal levitation.
The lodestone of Dubai, of course, is ‘peak oil’ and each time you spend $50 to fill your tank, you are helping to irrigate al-Maktoum’s oasis. Fuel prices are currently inflated by industrial China’s soaring demand as well as growing fears of war and terrorism in the global oil patch. According to the Wall Street Journal, ‘consumers will [have paid] $1.2 trillion more in 2004 and 2005 together for oil products than they did in 2003’. [15] As in the 1970s, a huge and disruptive transfer of wealth is taking place between oil-consuming and oil-producing nations. Already visible on the horizon, moreover, is Hubbert’s Peak, the tipping point when new petroleum reserves will no longer offset global demand, and thereafter oil prices will become truly stratospheric. In some utopian economic model, perhaps, this windfall would become an investment fund for shifting the global economy to renewable energy while reducing greenhouse gas output and raising the environmental efficiency of urban systems. In the real world of capitalism, however, it has become a subsidy for the apocalyptic luxuries that Dubai is coming to epitomize.
Miami of the Persian Gulf
According to his hagiographers, Dubai has arrived at its blessed state thanks largely to the entrepreneurial vision that al-Maktoum inherited from his father, Sheikh Rashid, who ‘committed himself and his resources to turning his emirate into a modern world-class entrepôt where free enterprise flourished’. [16] In fact, Dubai’s irresistible rise, like that of its parent, the United Arab Emirates, owes as much to a sequence of fortuitous geopolitical accidents. Dubai’s chief regional advantage, paradoxically, has been its modest endowment, now rapidly being exhausted, of offshore oil. With a tiny hinterland lacking the geological wealth of Kuwait or Abu Dhabi, Dubai has escaped poverty by a Singaporean strategy of becoming the key commercial, financial and recreational hub of the Gulf. It is a postmodern ‘city of nets’—as Brecht called ‘Mahagonny’—where the super-profits of the international oil trade are intercepted and then reinvested in Arabia’s one truly inexhaustible natural resource: sand. (Indeed, mega-projects in Dubai are typically measured by volumes of sand moved: one billion cubic feet in the case of the ‘island world’.) If the current mega-project blitzkrieg, exemplified by Dubailand, succeeds as planned, Dubai will derive all of its gdp from non-oil activities like tourism and finance by 2010. [17]
The platform for Dubai’s extraordinary ambitions has been its long history as a haven for smugglers, gold dealers and pirates. A late-Victorian treaty gave London control over Dubai’s foreign affairs, keeping the Ottomans and their tax collectors out of the region, but otherwise allowing the al-Maktoum dynasty to exploit their ownership of the only natural deepwater port along 400 miles of what was then known as the ‘Pirates’ Coast’. Pearl fishing and smuggling were the mainstays until oil wealth began to generate increased demand for Dubai’s commercial savvy and port services. Up to 1956, when the first concrete building was constructed, the entire population lived in traditional ‘barastri’ homes made from palm fronds, drawing water from communal wells and tethering their goats in the narrow streets. [18]
After the British withdrawal from East of Suez in 1968, Sheikh Rashid joined with the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed, to create the United Arab Emirates in 1971, a feudal federation bound together by the common threat of the Marxists in Oman and, later, the Islamists in Iran. Abu Dhabi possessed the greater share of the uae’s oil wealth (almost one-twelfth of the world’s proven hydrocarbon reserves) but Dubai was the more logical port and commercial centre. When the city’s original deep-water ‘creek’ proved too small to handle burgeoning trade, the uae’s leadership used some of their earnings from the first ‘oil shock’ to help Dubai finance construction of the world’s largest man-made port, completed in 1976.
Following Khomeini’s revolution in 1979, it also became the Persian Gulf’s Miami, providing refuge to a large community of Iranian exiles, many of whom specialized in smuggling gold, untaxed cigarettes and liquor to their puritanical homeland, and to India. More recently, Dubai under the tolerant gaze of Tehran has attracted large numbers of wealthy Iranians who use the city—more like Hong Kong than Miami —as a base for trade and bi-national life-styles. They are estimated to control as much as 30 per cent of Dubai’s current real-estate development. [19] Building on such clandestine connections, Dubai in the 1980s and early 1990s became the Gulf’s principal dirty-money laundry as well as a bolthole for some of the region’s most notorious gangsters and terrorists. As the Wall Street Journal recently described the city’s underside:
Its gold and diamond souks, houses of barter and informal cash-transfer storefronts have long formed an opaque business world based on connections and clan allegiances. Black-market operators, arms dealers, terrorist financiers and money launderers have taken advantage of the freewheeling environment, even if the vast bulk of business is legitimate. [20]
In early 2006 the us Congress erupted in a furore over Dubai Port World’s imminent takeover of the London-based Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, which operates docks from New York to Miami. Despite support from the Bush Administration, Dubai was forced to withdraw from the deal after a firestorm of accusations on cable news programmes and radio talk-shows about the supposed dangers of ceding control of American commercial ports to a Middle Eastern government. Much of the controversy was unquestionably fuelled by anti-Arab bigotry pure and simple (us port operations are already largely under management of foreign-owned firms), but Dubai’s ‘terrorist connection’, an outgrowth of its role as the Switzerland of the Gulf, has been well documented.
Indeed, since 9/11 a huge investigative literature has explored Dubai’s role as ‘the financial hub for Islamic militant groups’, especially al-Qaeda and the Taliban: ‘all roads lead to Dubai when it comes to [terrorist] money’, claims a former high-ranking us Treasury official. Bin Laden reportedly transferred large sums through the government-owned Dubai Islamic Bank, while the Taliban used the city’s unregulated gold markets to transform their opium taxes, paid in gold bullion, into laundered dollars. [21] In his best-selling Ghost Wars, Steve Coll claims that after the catastrophic al-Qaeda bombings of the us embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, a cia scheme to target bin Laden with cruise missiles while he was falcon hunting in southern Afghanistan had to be aborted because he was in the company of unnamed Emirati royalty. Coll adds that the cia ‘also suspected that C-130s flying out of Dubai carried weapons to the Taliban’. [22]
In addition, al-Maktoum for almost a decade provided luxurious sanctuary for Bombay’s Al Capone, the legendary gangster Dawood Ibrahim. His presence in the sheikhdom in the late 1980s was hardly low-key. ‘Dubai’, writes Suketu Mehta, ‘suited Dawood; he re-created Bombay in lavish parties, flying in scores of the city’s top film stars and cricketers as guests, and took a film starlet, Mandakini, as his mistress’. [23] In early 1993, according to the Indian government, Dawood, working with Pakistani intelligence officials, used Dubai as a base for organizing the infamous ‘Black Friday’ bombings in Bombay that killed 257 people. [24] Although India immediately requested Dubai to arrest Dawood, he was allowed to flee to Karachi, where he is still sheltered by the Pakistani government; his criminal organization, ‘D-Company’, meanwhile, has reportedly continued to be active in the sheikhdom. [25]
War zone
Dubai now enjoys high marks from Washington as a partner in the War on Terror and, in particular, as a base for spying on Iran; [26] but it is probable that al-Maktoum, like the other Emirati rulers, still keeps a channel open to radical Islamists. If al-Qaeda so desired, for example, it could presumably turn the Burj Al-Arab and Dubai’s other soaring landmarks into so many towering infernos. Yet so far Dubai is one of the few cities in the region to have entirely avoided car-bombings and attacks on Western tourists: eloquent testament, one might suppose, to the city-state’s continuing role as a money laundry and upscale hideout, like Tangiers in the 1940s or Macao in the 1960s. Dubai’s burgeoning black economy is its insurance policy against the car-bombers and airplane hijackers.
In many complex and surprising ways, Dubai actually earns its living from fear. Its huge port complex at Jebel Ali, for example, has profited immeasurably from the trade generated by the us invasion of Iraq, while Terminal Two at the Dubai airport, always crowded with Halliburton employees, private mercenaries and American soldiers en route to Baghdad or Kabul, has been described as ‘the busiest commercial terminal in the world’ for America’s Middle East wars. [27] Post-9/11 developments have also shifted global investment patterns to Dubai’s benefit. Thus after al-Qaeda’s attacks on America, the Muslim oil states, traumatized by the angry Christians in Washington and lawsuits by wtc survivors, no longer considered the United States the safest harbour for their petrodollars. Panicky Saudis alone are estimated to have repatriated at least one-third of their trillion-dollar overseas portfolio. Although nerves are now calmer, Dubai has benefited enormously from the continuing inclination of the oil sheikhs to invest within, rather than outside, the region. As Edward Chancellor has emphasized, ‘unlike the last oil boom of the late 1970s, relatively little of the current Arab oil surplus has been directly invested in us assets or even deposited in the international banking system. This time much of the oil money has remained at home where a classic speculative mania is now being played out.’ [28]
In 2004, the Saudis (500,000 of whom are estimated to visit Dubai at least once a year) were believed to have ploughed at least $7 billion into al-Maktoum’s major properties. Saudis, together with investors from Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Iran and even emulous Qatar, bankroll the hubris of Dubailand (officially developed by Dubai’s billionaire Galadari brothers) and other colossal fantasy projects. [29] Although economists stress the driving role of equity investment in the current Gulf boom, the region is also awash with cheap bank credit thanks to a 60 per cent increase in the local deposit base and the slipstreaming of the us Federal Reserve’s easy money policies (the currencies of the Gulf emirates are all linked to the dollar). [30]
Much of this money, of course, dances to an old tune. ‘A majority of new Dubai properties’, explains Business Week, ‘are being acquired for speculative purposes, with only small deposits put down. They are being flipped in the contemporary Miami manner.’ [31] But what is too often ‘flipped’, some economists predict, may ultimately flop. Will Dubai someday fall from the sky when this real-estate balloon bursts, or will peak oil keep this desert Laputa floating above the contradictions of the world economy? Al-Maktoum remains a mountain of self-confidence: ‘I would like to tell capitalists that Dubai does not need investors; investors need Dubai. And I tell you that the risk lies not in using your money, but in letting it pile up.’ [32]
Dubai’s philosopher-king (one of the huge offshore island projects will actually spell out an epigram of his in Arabic script) [33] is well aware that fear is also the most dynamic component of the oil revenues that turn his sand dunes into malls and skyscrapers. Every time insurgents blow up a pipeline in the Niger Delta, a martyr drives his truck bomb into a Riyadh housing complex, or Washington and Tel Aviv rattle their sabres at Tehran, the price of oil (and thus Dubai’s ultimate income) increases by some increment of anxiety in the all-important futures market. The Gulf economies, in other words, are now capitalized not just on oil production, but also on the fear of its disruption. According to a recent survey of experts by Business Week, ‘the world paid the Persian Gulf oil states an extra $120 billion or so last year because of the premium in prices due to fear of unexpected supply disruptions. Some cynics argue that oil producers welcome the fear of disruption because it boosts their revenues’. ‘Fear’, according to one of the senior energy analysts that the magazine consulted, ‘is a gift to oil producers’. [34]
But it is a gift that the oil rich would rather spend in a tranquil oasis surrounded by very high walls. With its sovereignty ultimately guaranteed by the American nuclear super-carriers usually berthed at Jebel Ali, as well as by whatever secret protocols (negotiated during falcon hunting trips in Afghanistan?) govern the Emiratis’ relationship to Islamic terrorism, Dubai is a paradise of personal security, from the Swiss-style laws governing financial secrecy to the armies of concierges, watchmen and bodyguards who protect its sanctums of luxury. Tourists are customarily ordered away by the security guards if they attempt to sneak a peek at Burj Al-Arab on its private island. Hotel guests, of course, arrive in Rolls Royces.
Milton Friedman’s beach club
Dubai, in other words, is a vast gated community, the ultimate Green Zone. But even more than Singapore or Texas, it is also the apotheosis of the neo-liberal values of contemporary capitalism: a society that might have been designed by the Economics Department of the University of Chicago. Dubai, indeed, has achieved what American reactionaries only dream of—an oasis of free enterprise without income taxes, trade unions or opposition parties (there are no elections). As befits a paradise of consumption, its unofficial national holiday, as well as its global logo, is the celebrated Shopping Festival, a month-long extravaganza sponsored by the city’s 25 malls that begins on 12 January and attracts 4 million upscale shoppers, primarily from the Middle East and South Asia. [35]
Feudal absolutism—the Maktoum dynasty owns the land area of Dubai —meanwhile has been spruced up as the last word in enlightened corporate administration, and the political sphere has been officially collapsed into the managerial. ‘People refer to our crown prince as the chief executive officer of Dubai. It’s because, genuinely, he runs government as a private business for the sake of the private sector, not for the sake of the state’, says Saeed al-Muntafiq, head of the Dubai Development and Investment Authority. Moreover, if the country is a single business, as al-Maktoum maintains, then ‘representative government’ is besides the point: after all, General Electric and Exxon are not democracies and no one—except for raving socialists—expects either to be so.
The state, accordingly, is almost indistinguishable from private enterprise. Dubai’s top managers—all commoners, hired meritocratically—simultaneously hold strategic government portfolios and manage a major Maktoum-controlled real-estate development company. ‘Government’, indeed, is really an equities management team led by three top players who compete with one another to earn the highest returns for al-Maktoum (see Table 2). ‘In such a system’, writes William Wallis, ‘the concept of a conflict of interest is barely recognized’. [36] Because the country has one ultimate landlord, and myriad streams of rent and lease payments all flow to a single beneficiary, Dubai is able to dispense with most of the sales, customs and income taxes essential to governments elsewhere. The minimal tax burden, in turn, leverages the sale or lease of Dubai’s golden sands. Oil-rich Abu Dhabi, meanwhile, subsidizes the residual state functions, including foreign relations and defence, entrusted to the Emirates’ federal administration—itself a condominium of the interests of the ruling sheikhs and their relatives.
In a similar spirit, personal liberty in Dubai derives strictly from the business plan, not from a constitution, much less ‘inalienable rights’. Al-Maktoum and his executives have to arbitrate between lineage-based power and Islamic law, on the one hand, and Western business culture and recreational decadence on the other. Their ingenious solution is a regime of what might be called ‘modular liberties’ based on the rigorous spatial segregation of economic functions and ethnically circumscribed social classes. To understand how this works in practice, it is necessary briefly to survey Dubai’s overall development strategy.
Although tourist development and its excesses generate most of the ‘buzz’ about Dubai, the city-state has extraordinary ambitions to capture as much value-added as possible through a series of specialized free-trade zones and high-tech clusters. ‘One of the ways that this trading town along a creek has reformulated itself into a megalopolis’, writes an abc News commentator, ‘is by throwing in everything and the kitchen sink as incentives for companies to invest in and relocate to Dubai. There are free-trade zones where 100 per cent foreign ownership is allowed, with no individual or corporate taxes or import/export duties whatsoever.’ [37] The original free-trade zone in the port district of Jebel Ali now has several thousand resident trading and industrial firms, and is the major base for American corporations selling to the Saudi and Gulf markets. [38]
Most future growth, however, is expected to be generated within an archipelago of specialized ‘clusters’. The largest of these cities-within-the-city are Internet City, already the Arab world’s principal information technology hub, with local subsidiaries of Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft, and others; Media City, home to the Al Arabiya satellite network and various international news organizations; and the Dubai International Financial Centre, whose dfix al-Maktoum hopes will grow into the largest stock exchange between Europe and East Asia as foreign investors rush to tap the Gulf’s vast reservoir of oil earnings. In addition to these mega-enclaves, each with tens of thousands of employees, Dubai also hosts or is planning to build a Humanitarian Aid City, as a base for disaster relief; a free-trade zone dedicated to the sale of used cars; a Dubai Metals and Commodities Centre; a ‘Chess City’ headquartering the International Chess Association and designed as a vast chess board with two ‘King’ towers, each 64 storeys high; and a $6 billion Healthcare Village, in collaboration with the Harvard Medical School, that will offer the wealthy classes of the Gulf region state-of-the-art American medical technology. [39]
Other cities in the region, of course, have free-trade zones and high-tech clusters, but only Dubai has allowed each enclave to operate under regulatory and legal bubble-domes tailored to the specific needs of foreign capital and expat professionals. ‘Carving out lucrative niches with their own special rules’, claims the Financial Times, ‘has been at the heart of Dubai’s development strategy’. [40] Thus press censorship (flagrant in the rest of Dubai) is largely suspended inside Media City, while internet access (regulated for content elsewhere) is absolutely unfettered inside Internet City. The uae has permitted Dubai to set up ‘an entirely separate, Western-based commercial system for its financial district that would do business in dollars, and in English’. Although not without ensuing controversy, Dubai even imported British financial regulators and retired judges to bolster confidence that dfix plays by the same rules as Zurich, London and New York. [41] Meanwhile, to promote the sell-off of Palm Jumeirah mansions and the private islands that make up the ‘island world’, al-Maktoum in May 2002 announced a ‘freehold revolution’, unique in the region, that allows foreigners to buy luxury property outright and not just as a 99-year lease. [42]
In addition to these enclaved regimes of greater media and business freedom, Dubai is also famously tolerant of Western vices, with the exception of recreational drugs. In contrast to Saudi Arabia or even Kuwait City, booze flows freely in the city’s hotels and expat bars, and no one looks askance at halter tops or even string bikinis on the beach. Dubai—any of the hipper guidebooks will advise—is also the ‘Bangkok of the Middle East’, with thousands of Russian, Armenian, Indian and Iranian prostitutes controlled by various transnational gangs and mafias. The Russian girls at the bar are the glamorous façade of a sinister sex trade built on kidnapping, slavery and sadistic violence. Al-Maktoum and his thoroughly modern regime, of course, disavow any collusion with this burgeoning red-light industry, although insiders know that the whores are essential to keeping the 5-star hotels full of European and Arab businessmen. [43] When expats extol Dubai’s unique ‘openness’, it is this freedom to carouse and debauch—not to organize unions or publish critical opinions—that they are usually praising.
An indentured, invisible majority
Dubai, together with its emirate neighbors, has achieved the state of the art in the disenfranchisement of labour. In a country that only abolished slavery in 1963, trade unions, most strikes and all agitators are illegal, and 99 per cent of the private-sector workforce are immediately deportable non-citizens. Indeed, the deep thinkers at the American Enterprise and Cato Institutes must salivate when they contemplate the system of classes and entitlements in Dubai.
At the top of the social pyramid, of course, are the al-Maktoums and their cousins who own every lucrative grain of sand in the sheikhdom. Next, the native 15 per cent of the population (many of them originally Arab-speakers from southern Iran) constitutes a leisure class whose uniform of privilege is the traditional white dishdash. Their obedience to the dynasty is rewarded by income transfers, free education, subsidized homes and government jobs. A step below are the pampered mercenaries: more than 100,000 British expatriates (another 100,000 uk citizens own second homes or condos in Dubai), along with other European, Lebanese, Iranian and Indian managers and professionals, who take full advantage of their air-conditioned affluence and two months of overseas leave every summer. The Brits, led by David Beckham (who owns a beach) and Rod Stewart (who owns an island), are probably the biggest cheerleaders for al-Maktoum’s paradise, and many of them luxuriate in a social world that recalls the lost splendour of gin-and-tonics at Raffles and white mischief in Simla’s bungalows. Dubai is expert at catering to colonial nostalgia. [44]
The city-state is also a miniature Raj in a more important and notorious aspect. The great mass of the population are South Asian contract labourers, legally bound to a single employer and subject to totalitarian social controls. Dubai’s luxury lifestyles are attended by vast numbers of Filipina, Sri Lankan and Indian maids, while the building boom (which employs fully one-quarter of the workforce) is carried on the shoulders of an army of poorly paid Pakistanis and Indians, the largest contingent from Kerala, working twelve-hour shifts, six and a half days a week, in the asphalt-melting desert heat.
Dubai, like its neighbours, flouts ilo labour regulations and refuses to adopt the international Migrant Workers Convention. Human Rights Watch in 2003 accused the Emirates of building prosperity on ‘forced labour’. Indeed, as the Independent recently emphasized, ‘the labour market closely resembles the old indentured labour system brought to Dubai by its former colonial master, the British.’ ‘Like their impoverished forefathers’, the London paper continued, ‘today’s Asian workers are forced to sign themselves into virtual slavery for years when they arrive in the United Arab Emirates. Their rights disappear at the airport where recruitment agents confiscate their passports and visas to control them.’ [45]
In addition to being super-exploited, Dubai’s helots—like the proletariat in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis—are also expected to be generally invisible. The local press (the uae ranks a dismal 137th on the global Press Freedom Index) is restrained from reporting on migrant workers, exploitative working conditions, and prostitution. Likewise, ‘Asian labourers are banned from the glitzy shopping malls, new golf courses and smart restaurants.’ [46] Nor are the bleak work camps on the city’s outskirts—where labourers are crowded six, eight, even twelve to a room, often without air-conditioning or functioning toilets—part of the official tourist image of a city of luxury, without poverty or slums. [47] In a recent visit, even the uae Minister of Labour was reported to be shocked by the squalid, almost unbearable conditions in a remote work camp maintained by a large construction contractor. Yet when the labourers attempted to form a union to win back pay and improve living conditions, they were promptly arrested. [48]
Dubai’s police may turn a blind eye to illicit diamond and gold imports, prostitution rings, and shady characters who buy 25 villas at a time in cash, but they are diligent in deporting Pakistani workers who complain about being cheated out of their wages by unscrupulous contractors, or jailing Filipina maids for ‘adultery’ when they report being raped by their employers. [49] To avoid the simmering volcano of Shiite unrest that so worries Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, Dubai and its uae neighbours have favoured a non-Arab workforce drawn from western India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Philippines. But as Asian workers have become an increasingly restive majority, the uae has reversed course and adopted a ‘cultural diversity policy’—‘we have been asked not to recruit any more Asians’, explained one contractor—to reinforce control over the workforce by diluting the existing national concentrations with more Arab workers. [50]
Discrimination against Asians, however, has failed to recruit enough Arabs willing to work at the lowly wages ($100 to $150 per month) paid to construction labourers to meet the insatiable demands of the exploding skyline and half-built mega-projects. [51] Indeed the building boom, with its appalling safety record and negligence of workers’ most basic needs, has incubated Dubai’s first labour rebellion. In 2004 alone, Human Rights Watch estimated that as many as 880 construction workers were killed on the job, with most of the fatal accidents unreported by employers or covered up by the government. [52] At the same time, the giant construction companies and their subcontractors have failed to guarantee minimum facilities for sanitation or adequate supplies of potable water at remote desert labour camps. Workers also have been exasperated by longer commutes to worksites, the petty tyranny (often with a racial or religious bias) of their supervisors, the spies and company guards in their camps, the debt-bondage of their labour contracts, and the government’s failure to prosecute fly-by-night contractors who leave Dubai or declare bankruptcy without paying back wages. [53] As one embittered labourer from Kerala told the New York Times, ‘I wish the rich people would realize who is building these towers. I wish they could come and see how sad this life is.’ [54]
The first tremor of unrest came in fall 2004 when several thousand Asian workers courageously marched down the eight-lane Sheikh Zayed Highway toward the Ministry of Labour, only to be met by riot police and officials threatening mass deportations. [55] Smaller demonstrations and strikes, protesting unpaid wages or unsafe working conditions, continued through 2005, drawing inspiration from a large uprising of Bangladeshi workers in Kuwait during the spring. In September, an estimated 7,000 workers demonstrated for three hours, the largest protest in Dubai history. Then, on 22 March 2006, bullying security men ignited a riot at the vast Burj Dubai tower site.
Some 2,500 exhausted workers were waiting after the end of their shift for long overdue buses to take them back to their dormitories in the desert, when the guards began to harass them. The enraged labourers, many of them Indian Muslims, overwhelmed and beat the guards, then attacked the construction headquarters: burning company cars, ransacking offices, destroying computers and smashing files. The following morning, the army of labourers defied police to return to the site, where they refused to work until Dubai-based Al Naboodah Laing O’Rourke raised wages and improved working conditions. Thousands of construction workers at a new airport terminal also joined the wildcat strike. Although some minor concessions along with draconian threats forced most of the labourers back to work at the Burj Dubai and the airport, the underlying grievances continue to fester. In July, hundreds of labourers at the Arabian Ranches project on Emirates Road rioted to protest the chronic shortage of water for cooking and bathing at their camp. Other workers have held clandestine union meetings and reportedly threatened to picket hotels and malls. [56]
The unruly voice of labour echoes louder in the deserts of the uae than it might elsewhere. At the end of the day, Dubai is capitalized just as much on cheap labour as it is on expensive oil, and the Maktoums, like their cousins in the other emirates, are exquisitely aware that they reign over a kingdom built on the backs of a South Asian workforce. So much has been invested in Dubai’s image as an imperturbable paradise of capital that even small disturbances can have exaggerated impacts on investors’ confidence. Dubai Inc. is thus currently considering a variety of responses to worker unrest, ranging from expulsions and mass arrests to some limited franchising of collective bargaining. But any tolerance of protest risks future demands not just for unions, but for citizenship, and thereby threatens the absolutist foundations of Maktoum rule. None of the shareholders in Dubai—whether the American Navy, the Saudi billionaires, or the frolicking expats—want to see the emergence of a Solidarnosc in the desert.
Al-Maktoum, who fancies himself the Gulf’s prophet of modernization, likes to impress visitors with clever proverbs and heavy aphorisms. A favourite: ‘Anyone who does not attempt to change the future will stay a captive of the past’. [57] Yet the future that he is building in Dubai—to the applause of billionaires and transnational corporations everywhere—looks like nothing so much as a nightmare of the past: Speer meets Disney on the shores of Araby.
A version of this essay will appear in Mike Davis and Daniel Monk, eds, Evil Paradises: The Dreamworlds of Neo-Liberalism, to be published by New Press in 2007.
[1] Business Week, 13 March 2006.
[2] ‘Dubai overtakes Las Vegas as world’s hotel capital’, Travel Weekly, 3 May 2005.
[3] ‘Ski in the Desert?’, Observer, 20 November 2005; Hydropolis: Project Description, Dubai, August 2003, www.conway.com.
[4] See the Mena Report 2005, at www.menareport.com.
[5] As a Dubai tourist official once complained to an American journalist about Egypt: ‘They have the pyramids and they do nothing with them. Can you imagine what we’d do with the pyramids?’ Lee Smith, ‘The Road to Tech Mecca’, Wired Magazine, July 2004.
[6] Official Dubailand faqs (from the marketing department). ‘It’s as if a list of all known human pastimes have been collected on PowerPoint slides and then casually voted on by a show of hands.’ Ian Parker, ‘The Mirage’, The New Yorker, 17 October 2005.
[7] Parker, ‘Mirage’.
[8] The Maktoums also own Madame Tussaud’s in London, the Helmsley Building and the Essex House in Manhattan, thousands of apartments in the Sunbelt states, enormous ranches in Kentucky and what the New York Times describes as a ‘significant stake in DaimlerChrysler’. See ‘Royal Family of Dubai Pays $1.1 Billion for 2 Pieces of New York Skyline’, 10 November 2005.
[9] Saudi Arabia’s ‘King Abdullah Economic City’—a projected $30 billion development on the Red Sea—will in fact be a satellite of Dubai, built by Emaar, the giant real-estate company owned by the Maktoum dynasty. See ‘opec Nations Temper the Extravagance’, New York Times, 1 February 2006.
[10] Rowan Moore, ‘Vertigo: the strange new world of the contemporary city’, in Moore, ed., Vertigo, Corte Madera, ca 1999.
[11] ‘Emirate rebrands itself as a global melting pot’, Financial Times, 12 July 2005.
[12] George Katodrytis, ‘Metropolitan Dubai and the Rise of Architectural Fantasy’ Bidoun, no. 4, Spring 2005.
[13] ‘In China, To Get Rich Is Glorious’, Business Week, 6 February 2006.
[14] Baruch Knei-Paz, The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky, Oxford 1978, p. 91.
[15] ‘Oil Producers Gain Global Clout from Big Windfall’, wsj, 4 October 2005.
[16] Joseph Kechichian, ‘Sociopolitical Origins of Emirati Leaders’, in Kechichian, ed., A Century in Thirty Years: Shaykh Zayed and the uae, Washington dc 2000, p. 54.
[17] Jack Lyne, ‘Disney Does the Desert?’, 17 November 2003, online at The Site Selection.
[18] Michael Pacione, ‘City Profile: Dubai’, Cities, vol. 22, no. 3, 2005, pp. 259–60.
[19] ‘Young Iranians Follow Dreams to Dubai’, New York Times, 4 December 2005. There is also a dramatic recent influx of wealthy Iranian-Americans and ‘some Dubai streets are beginning to resemble parts of Los Angeles’.
[20] wsj, 2 March 2006.
[21] Gilbert King, The Most Dangerous Man in the World: Dawood Ibrahim, New York, ny 2004, p. 78; Douglas Farah, ‘Al Qaeda’s Gold: Following Trail to Dubai’, Washington Post, 18 February 2002; and Sean Foley, ‘What Wealth Cannot Buy: uae Security at the Turn of the 21st Century’, in Barry Rubin, ed., Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf, London 2002, pp. 51–2.
[22] Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, New York 2004, p. 449.
[23] Suketu Mehta, Maximum City: Bombay Lost and Found, New York 2004, p. 135.
[24] S. Hussain Zaidi, Black Friday: The True Story of the Bombay Bomb Blasts, Delhi 2002, pp. 25–7 and 41–4.
[25] See ‘Dubai’s Cooperation with the War on Terrorism Called into Question’, Transnational Threats Update, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, February 2003, pp. 2–3; and ‘Bin Laden’s operatives still using freewheeling Dubai’, usa Today, 2 September 2004.
[26] Ira Chernus, ‘Dubai: Home Base for Cold War’, 13 March 2006, Common Dreams News Centre.
[27] Pratap Chatterjee, ‘Ports of Profit: Dubai Does Brisk War Business’, 25 February 2006, Common Dreams News Centre.
[28] Edward Chancellor, ‘Seven Pillars of Folly’, wsj, 8 March 2006; on Saudi repatriations, ame Info, 20 March 2005.
[29] ame Info, 9 June 2005.
[30] Chancellor, ‘Seven Pillars’.
[31] Stanley Reed, ‘The New Middle East Bonanza’, Business Week, 13 March 2006.
[32] Lyne, ‘Disney Does the Desert?’.
[33] Viewed from space, 1060 Water Homes at The Palm, Jebel Ali, will read: ‘Take wisdom from the wise people. Not everyone who rides is a jockey.’
[34] Peter Coy, ‘Oil Pricing’, Business Week, 13 March 2006.
[35] Tarek Atia, ‘Everybody’s a Winner’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 9 February 2005.
[36] William Wallis, ‘Big Business: Intense rivalry among the lieutenants’, Financial Times, 12 July 2005.
[37] Hari Sreenivasan, ‘Dubai: Build It and They Will Come’, abc News, 8 February 2005.
[38] Pacione, ‘City Profile: Dubai’, p. 257.
[39] Smith, ‘The Road to Tech Mecca’; Stanley Reed, ‘A Bourse is Born in Dubai’, Business Week, 3 October 2005; and Roula Khalaf, ‘Stock Exchanges: Chance to tap into a vast pool of capital’, Financial Times, 12 July 2005.
[40] Khalaf, ‘Stock Exchanges’.
[41] William McSheehy, ‘Financial centre: A three-way race for supremacy’, Financial Times, 12 July 2005.
[42] ‘A Short History of Dubai Property’, ame Info, August 2004.
[43] Lonely Planet, Dubai: City Guide, London 2004, p. 9; and William Ridgeway, ‘Dubai, Dubai—The Scandal and the Vice’, Social Affairs Unit, 4 April 2005.
[44] William Wallis, ‘Demographics: Locals swamped by a new breed of resident’, Financial Times, 12 July 2005.
[45] Nick Meo, ‘How Dubai, playground of business men and warlords, is built by Asian wage slaves’, Independent, 1 March 2005.
[46] Meo, ‘How Dubai’.
[47] Lucy Williamson, ‘Migrants’ Woes in Dubai Worker Camps’, bbc News, 10 February 2005.
[48] See account posted on 15 February 2005, at secretdubai.blogspot.com.
[49] On the jailing of rape victims, see Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants, News Digest, September 2003.
[50] Meena Janardhan, ‘Welcome mat shrinking for Asian workers in uae’, Inter Press Service, 2003.
[51] See Ray Jureidini, Migrant Workers and Xenophobia in the Middle East, un Research Institute for Social Development, Identities, Conflict and Cohesion: Programme Paper No. 2, Geneva, December 2003.
[52] ‘uae: Abuse of Migrant Workers’, Human Rights Watch, 30 March 2006.
[53] Anthony Shadid, ‘In uae, Tales of Paradise Lost’, Washington Post, 12 April 2006.
[54] Hassan Fattah, ‘In Dubai, an Outcry from Asians for Workplace Rights’, New York Times, 26 March 2006.
[55] Julia Wheeler, ‘Workers’ safety queried in Dubai’, bbc News, 27 September 2004.
[56] Fattah, ‘In Dubai’; Dan McDougall, ‘Tourists become targets as Dubai’s workers take revolt to the beaches’, Observer, 9 April 2006; and ‘Rioting in Dubai Labour Camp’, Arab News, 4 July 2006.
[57] Quoted in Lyne, ‘Disney Does the Desert?’.

Friday, May 05, 2006

After Neoconservatism

After Neoconservatism
By
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA (NYT) 4646 words Published: February 19, 2006As
We approach the third anniversary of the onset of the Iraq war, it seems very unlikely thathistory will judge either the intervention itself or the ideas animating it kindly. By invadingIraq, the Bush administration created a self-fulfilling prophecy: Iraq has now replacedAfghanistan as a magnet, a training ground and an operational base for jihadist terrorists, withplenty of American targets to shoot at. The United States still has a chance of creating aShiite-dominated democratic Iraq, but the new government will be very weak for years to come;the resulting power vacuum will invite outside influence from all of Iraq's neighbors, includingIran. There are clear benefits to the Iraqi people from the removal of Saddam Hussein'sdictatorship, and perhaps some positive spillover effects in Lebanon and Syria. But it is veryhard to see how these developments in themselves justify the blood and treasure that the UnitedStates has spent on the project to this point. The so-called Bush Doctrine that set the framework for the administration's first term is now inshambles. The doctrine (elaborated, among other places, in the 2002 National Security Strategyof the United States) argued that, in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, America would have tolaunch periodic preventive wars to defend itself against rouge states and terrorists withweapons of mass destruction; that it would do this alone, if necessary; and that it would workto democratize the greater Middle East as a long-term solution to the terrorist problem. Butsuccessful pre-emption depends on the ability to predict the future accurately and on goodintelligence, which was not forthcoming, while America's perceived unilateralism has isolated itas never before. It is not surprising that in its second term, the administration has beendistancing itself from these policies and is in the process of rewriting the National SecurityStrategy document. But it is the idealistic effort to use American power to promote democracy and human rightsabroad that may suffer the greatest setback. Perceived failure in Iraq has restored theauthority of foreign policy ''realists'' in the tradition of Henry Kissinger. Already there is ahost of books and articles decrying America's naïve Wilsonianism and attacking the notion oftrying to democratize the world. The administration's second-term efforts to push for greaterMiddle Eastern democracy, introduced with the soaring rhetoric of Bush's second InauguralAddress, have borne very problematic fruits. The Islamist Muslim Brotherhood made a strongshowing in Egypt's parliamentary elections in November and December. While the holding ofelections in Iraq this past December was an achievement in itself, the vote led to theascendance of a Shiite bloc with close ties to Iran (following on the election of theconservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president of Iran in June). But the clincher was thedecisive Hamas victory in the Palestinian election last month, which brought to power a movementovertly dedicated to the destruction of Israel. In his second inaugural, Bush said that''America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one,'' but the charge will be madewith increasing frequency that the Bush administration made a big mistake when it stirred thepot, and that the United States would have done better to stick by its traditional authoritarianfriends in the Middle East. Indeed, the effort to promote democracy around the world has beenattacked as an illegitimate activity both by people on the left like Jeffrey Sachs and bytraditional conservatives like Pat Buchanan. The reaction against democracy promotion and an activist foreign policy may not end there. Thosewhom Walter Russell Mead labels Jacksonian conservatives -- red-state Americans whose sons anddaughters are fighting and dying in the Middle East -- supported the Iraq war because theybelieved that their children were fighting to defend the United States against nuclearterrorism, not to promote democracy. They don't want to abandon the president in the middle of avicious war, but down the road the perceived failure of the Iraq intervention may push them tofavor a more isolationist foreign policy, which is a more natural political position for them. Arecent Pew poll indicates a swing in public opinion toward isolationism; the percentage ofAmericans saying that the United States ''should mind its own business'' has never been highersince the end of the Vietnam War. More than any other group, it was the neoconservatives both inside and outside the Bushadministration who pushed for democratizing Iraq and the broader Middle East. They are widelycredited (or blamed) for being the decisive voices promoting regime change in Iraq, and yet itis their idealistic agenda that in the coming months and years will be the most directlythreatened. Were the United States to retreat from the world stage, following a drawdown inIraq, it would in my view be a huge tragedy, because American power and influence have beencritical to the maintenance of an open and increasingly democratic order around the world. Theproblem with neoconservatism's agenda lies not in its ends, which are as American as apple pie,but rather in the overmilitarized means by which it has sought to accomplish them. What Americanforeign policy needs is not a return to a narrow and cynical realism, but rather the formulationof a ''realistic Wilsonianism'' that better matches means to ends. The Neoconservative Legacy How did the neoconservatives end up overreaching to such an extent that they risk underminingtheir own goals? The Bush administration's first-term foreign policy did not flow ineluctablyfrom the views of earlier generations of people who considered themselves neoconservatives,since those views were themselves complex and subject to differing interpretations. Four commonprinciples or threads ran through much of this thought up through the end of the cold war: aconcern with democracy, human rights and, more generally, the internal politics of states; abelief that American power can be used for moral purposes; a skepticism about the ability ofinternational law and institutions to solve serious security problems; and finally, a view thatambitious social engineering often leads to unexpected consequences and thereby undermines itsown ends. The problem was that two of these principles were in potential collision. The skeptical stancetoward ambitious social engineering -- which in earlier years had been applied mostly todomestic policies like affirmative action, busing and welfare -- suggested a cautious approachtoward remaking the world and an awareness that ambitious initiatives always have unanticipatedconsequences. The belief in the potential moral uses of American power, on the other hand,implied that American activism could reshape the structure of global politics. By the time ofthe Iraq war, the belief in the transformational uses of power had prevailed over the doubtsabout social engineering. In retrospect, things did not have to develop this way. The roots of neoconservatism lie in aremarkable group of largely Jewish intellectuals who attended City College of New York(C.C.N.Y.) in the mid- to late 1930's and early 1940's, a group that included Irving Kristol,Daniel Bell, Irving Howe, Nathan Glazer and, a bit later, Daniel Patrick Moynihan. The story ofthis group has been told in a number of places, most notably in a documentary film by JosephDorman called ''Arguing the World.'' The most important inheritance from the C.C.N.Y. group wasan idealistic belief in social progress and the universality of rights, coupled with intenseanti-Communism. It is not an accident that many in the C.C.N.Y. group started out as Trotskyites. Leon Trotskywas, of course, himself a Communist, but his supporters came to understand better than mostpeople the utter cynicism and brutality of the Stalinist regime. The anti-Communist left, incontrast to the traditional American right, sympathized with the social and economic aims ofCommunism, but in the course of the 1930's and 1940's came to realize that ''real existingsocialism'' had become a monstrosity of unintended consequences that completely undermined theidealistic goals it espoused. While not all of the C.C.N.Y. thinkers became neoconservatives,the danger of good intentions carried to extremes was a theme that would underlie the life workof many members of this group. If there was a single overarching theme to the domestic social policy critiques issued by thosewho wrote for the neoconservative journal The Public Interest, founded by Irving Kristol, NathanGlazer and Daniel Bell in 1965, it was the limits of social engineering. Writers like Glazer,Moynihan and, later, Glenn Loury argued that ambitious efforts to seek social justice often leftsocieties worse off than before because they either required massive state intervention thatdisrupted pre-existing social relations (for example, forced busing) or else producedunanticipated consequences (like an increase in single-parent families as a result of welfare).A major theme running through James Q. Wilson's extensive writings on crime was the idea thatyou could not lower crime rates by trying to solve deep underlying problems like poverty andracism; effective policies needed to focus on shorter-term measures that went after symptoms ofsocial distress (like subway graffiti or panhandling) rather than root causes. How, then, did a group with such a pedigree come to decide that the ''root cause'' of terrorismlay in the Middle East's lack of democracy, that the United States had both the wisdom and theability to fix this problem and that democracy would come quickly and painlessly to Iraq?Neoconservatives would not have taken this turn but for the peculiar way that the cold warended. Ronald Reagan was ridiculed by sophisticated people on the American left and in Europe forlabeling the Soviet Union and its allies an ''evil empire'' and for challenging MikhailGorbachev not just to reform his system but also to ''tear down this wall.'' His assistantsecretary of defense for international security policy, Richard Perle, was denounced as the''prince of darkness'' for this uncompromising, hard-line position; his proposal for adouble-zero in the intermediate-range nuclear arms negotiations (that is, the completeelimination of medium-range missiles) was attacked as hopelessly out of touch by thebien-pensant centrist foreign-policy experts at places like the Council on Foreign Relations andthe State Department. That community felt that the Reaganites were dangerously utopian in theirhopes for actually winning, as opposed to managing, the cold war. And yet total victory in the cold war is exactly what happened in 1989-91. Gorbachev acceptednot only the double zero but also deep cuts in conventional forces, and then failed to stop thePolish, Hungarian and East German defections from the empire. Communism collapsed within acouple of years because of its internal moral weaknesses and contradictions, and with regimechange in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact threat to the Westevaporated. The way the cold war ended shaped the thinking of supporters of the Iraq war, including youngerneoconservatives like William Kristol and Robert Kagan, in two ways. First, it seems to havecreated an expectation that all totalitarian regimes were hollow at the core and would crumblewith a small push from outside. The model for this was Romania under the Ceausescus: once thewicked witch was dead, the munchkins would rise up and start singing joyously about theirliberation. As Kristol and Kagan put it in their 2000 book ''Present Dangers'': ''To many theidea of America using its power to promote changes of regime in nations ruled by dictators ringsof utopianism. But in fact, it is eminently realistic. There is something perverse in declaringthe impossibility of promoting democratic change abroad in light of the record of the past threedecades.'' This overoptimism about postwar transitions to democracy helps explain the Bush administration'sincomprehensible failure to plan adequately for the insurgency that subsequently emerged inIraq. The war's supporters seemed to think that democracy was a kind of default condition towhich societies reverted once the heavy lifting of coercive regime change occurred, rather thana long-term process of institution-building and reform. While they now assert that they knew allalong that the democratic transformation of Iraq would be long and hard, they were clearly takenby surprise. According to George Packer's recent book on Iraq, ''The Assassins' Gate,'' thePentagon planned a drawdown of American forces to some 25,000 troops by the end of the summerfollowing the invasion. By the 1990's, neoconservatism had been fed by several other intellectual streams. One came fromthe students of the German Jewish political theorist Leo Strauss, who, contrary to much of thenonsense written about him by people like Anne Norton and Shadia Drury, was a serious reader ofphilosophical texts who did not express opinions on contemporary politics or policy issues.Rather, he was concerned with the ''crisis of modernity'' brought on by the relativism ofNietzsche and Heidegger, as well as the fact that neither the claims of religion nor deeply-heldopinions about the nature of the good life could be banished from politics, as the thinkers ofthe European Enlightenment had hoped. Another stream came from Albert Wohlstetter, a RandCorporation strategist who was the teacher of Richard Perle, Zalmay Khalilzad (the currentAmerican ambassador to Iraq) and Paul Wolfowitz (the former deputy secretary of defense), amongother people. Wohlstetter was intensely concerned with the problem of nuclear proliferation andthe way that the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty left loopholes, in its support for ''peaceful''nuclear energy, large enough for countries like Iraq and Iran to walk through. I have numerous affiliations with the different strands of the neoconservative movement. I was astudent of Strauss's protégé Allan Bloom, who wrote the bestseller ''The Closing of the AmericanMind''; worked at Rand and with Wohlstetter on Persian Gulf issues; and worked also on twooccasions for Wolfowitz. Many people have also interpreted my book ''The End of History and theLast Man'' (1992) as a neoconservative tract, one that argued in favor of the view that there isa universal hunger for liberty in all people that will inevitably lead them to liberaldemocracy, and that we are living in the midst of an accelerating, transnational movement infavor of that liberal democracy. This is a misreading of the argument. ''The End of History'' isin the end an argument about modernization. What is initially universal is not the desire forliberal democracy but rather the desire to live in a modern -- that is, technologically advancedand prosperous -- society, which, if satisfied, tends to drive demands for politicalparticipation. Liberal democracy is one of the byproducts of this modernization process,something that becomes a universal aspiration only in the course of historical time. ''The End of History,'' in other words, presented a kind of Marxist argument for the existenceof a long-term process of social evolution, but one that terminates in liberal democracy ratherthan communism. In the formulation of the scholar Ken Jowitt, the neoconservative positionarticulated by people like Kristol and Kagan was, by contrast, Leninist; they believed thathistory can be pushed along with the right application of power and will. Leninism was a tragedyin its Bolshevik version, and it has returned as farce when practiced by the United States.Neoconservatism, as both a political symbol and a body of thought, has evolved into something Ican no longer support. The Failure of Benevolent Hegemony The Bush administration and its neoconservative supporters did not simply underestimate thedifficulty of bringing about congenial political outcomes in places like Iraq; they alsomisunderstood the way the world would react to the use of American power. Of course, the coldwar was replete with instances of what the foreign policy analyst Stephen Sestanovich callsAmerican maximalism, wherein Washington acted first and sought legitimacy and support from itsallies only after the fact. But in the post-cold-war period, the structural situation of worldpolitics changed in ways that made this kind of exercise of power much more problematic in theeyes of even close allies. After the fall of the Soviet Union, various neoconservative authorslike Charles Krauthammer, William Kristol and Robert Kagan suggested that the United Stateswould use its margin of power to exert a kind of ''benevolent hegemony'' over the rest of theworld, fixing problems like rogue states with W.M.D., human rights abuses and terrorist threatsas they came up. Writing before the Iraq war, Kristol and Kagan considered whether this posturewould provoke resistance from the rest of the world, and concluded, ''It is precisely becauseAmerican foreign policy is infused with an unusually high degree of morality that other nationsfind they have less to fear from its otherwise daunting power.'' (Italics added.) It is hard to read these lines without irony in the wake of the global reaction to the Iraq war,which succeeded in uniting much of the world in a frenzy of anti-Americanism. The idea that theUnited States is a hegemon more benevolent than most is not an absurd one, but there werewarning signs that things had changed in America's relationship to the world long before thestart of the Iraq war. The structural imbalance in global power had grown enormous. Americasurpassed the rest of the world in every dimension of power by an unprecedented margin, with itsdefense spending nearly equal to that of the rest of the world combined. Already during theClinton years, American economic hegemony had generated enormous hostility to anAmerican-dominated process of globalization, frequently on the part of close democratic allieswho thought the United States was seeking to impose its antistatist social model on them. There were other reasons as well why the world did not accept American benevolent hegemony. Inthe first place, it was premised on American exceptionalism, the idea that America could use itspower in instances where others could not because it was more virtuous than other countries. Thedoctrine of pre-emption against terrorist threats contained in the 2002 National SecurityStrategy was one that could not safely be generalized through the international system; Americawould be the first country to object if Russia, China, India or France declared a similar rightof unilateral action. The United States was seeking to pass judgment on others while beingunwilling to have its own conduct questioned in places like the International Criminal Court. Another problem with benevolent hegemony was domestic. There are sharp limits to the Americanpeople's attention to foreign affairs and willingness to finance projects overseas that do nothave clear benefits to American interests. Sept. 11 changed that calculus in many ways,providing popular support for two wars in the Middle East and large increases in defensespending. But the durability of the support is uncertain: although most Americans want to dowhat is necessary to make the project of rebuilding Iraq succeed, the aftermath of the invasiondid not increase the public appetite for further costly interventions. Americans are not, atheart, an imperial people. Even benevolent hegemons sometimes have to act ruthlessly, and theyneed a staying power that does not come easily to people who are reasonably content with theirown lives and society. Finally, benevolent hegemony presumed that the hegemon was not only well intentioned butcompetent as well. Much of the criticism of the Iraq intervention from Europeans and others wasnot based on a normative case that the United States was not getting authorization from theUnited Nations Security Council, but rather on the belief that it had not made an adequate casefor invading Iraq in the first place and didn't know what it was doing in trying to democratizeIraq. In this, the critics were unfortunately quite prescient. The most basic misjudgment was an overestimation of the threat facing the United States fromradical Islamism. Although the new and ominous possibility of undeterrable terrorists armed withweapons of mass destruction did indeed present itself, advocates of the war wrongly conflatedthis with the threat presented by Iraq and with the rogue state/proliferation problem moregenerally. The misjudgment was based in part on the massive failure of the American intelligencecommunity to correctly assess the state of Iraq's W.M.D. programs before the war. But theintelligence community never took nearly as alarmist a view of the terrorist/W.M.D. threat asthe war's supporters did. Overestimation of this threat was then used to justify the elevationof preventive war to the centerpiece of a new security strategy, as well as a whole series ofmeasures that infringed on civil liberties, from detention policy to domestic eavesdropping. What to Do Now that the neoconservative moment appears to have passed, the United States needs toreconceptualize its foreign policy in several fundamental ways. In the first instance, we needto demilitarize what we have been calling the global war on terrorism and shift to other typesof policy instruments. We are fighting hot counterinsurgency wars in Afghanistan and Iraq andagainst the international jihadist movement, wars in which we need to prevail. But ''war'' isthe wrong metaphor for the broader struggle, since wars are fought at full intensity and haveclear beginnings and endings. Meeting the jihadist challenge is more of a ''long, twilightstruggle'' whose core is not a military campaign but a political contest for the hearts andminds of ordinary Muslims around the world. As recent events in France and Denmark suggest,Europe will be a central battleground in this fight. The United States needs to come up with something better than ''coalitions of the willing'' tolegitimate its dealings with other countries. The world today lacks effective internationalinstitutions that can confer legitimacy on collective action; creating new organizations thatwill better balance the dual requirements of legitimacy and effectiveness will be the primarytask for the coming generation. As a result of more than 200 years of political evolution, wehave a relatively good understanding of how to create institutions that are rulebound,accountable and reasonably effective in the vertical silos we call states. What we do not haveare adequate mechanisms of horizontal accountability among states. The conservative critique of the United Nations is all too cogent: while useful for certainpeacekeeping and nation-building operations, the United Nations lacks both democratic legitimacyand effectiveness in dealing with serious security issues. The solution is not to strengthen asingle global body, but rather to promote what has been emerging in any event, a''multi-multilateral world'' of overlapping and occasionally competing internationalinstitutions that are organized on regional or functional lines. Kosovo in 1999 was a model:when the Russian veto prevented the Security Council from acting, the United States and its NATOallies simply shifted the venue to NATO, where the Russians could not block action. The final area that needs rethinking, and the one that will be the most contested in the comingmonths and years, is the place of democracy promotion in American foreign policy. The worstlegacy that could come from the Iraq war would be an anti-neoconservative backlash that coupleda sharp turn toward isolation with a cynical realist policy aligning the United States withfriendly authoritarians. Good governance, which involves not just democracy but also the rule oflaw and economic development, is critical to a host of outcomes we desire, from alleviatingpoverty to dealing with pandemics to controlling violent conflicts. A Wilsonian policy that paysattention to how rulers treat their citizens is therefore right, but it needs to be informed bya certain realism that was missing from the thinking of the Bush administration in its firstterm and of its neoconservative allies. We need in the first instance to understand that promoting democracy and modernization in theMiddle East is not a solution to the problem of jihadist terrorism; in all likelihood it willmake the short-term problem worse, as we have seen in the case of the Palestinian electionbringing Hamas to power. Radical Islamism is a byproduct of modernization itself, arising fromthe loss of identity that accompanies the transition to a modern, pluralist society. It is noaccident that so many recent terrorists, from Sept. 11's Mohamed Atta to the murderer of theDutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh to the London subway bombers, were radicalized in democraticEurope and intimately familiar with all of democracy's blessings. More democracy will mean morealienation, radicalization and -- yes, unfortunately -- terrorism. But greater political participation by Islamist groups is very likely to occur whatever we do,and it will be the only way that the poison of radical Islamism can ultimately work its waythrough the body politic of Muslim communities around the world. The age is long since gone whenfriendly authoritarians could rule over passive populations and produce stability indefinitely.New social actors are mobilizing everywhere, from Bolivia and Venezuela to South Africa and thePersian Gulf. A durable Israeli-Palestinian peace could not be built upon a corrupt,illegitimate Fatah that constantly had to worry about Hamas challenging its authority. Peacemight emerge, sometime down the road, from a Palestine run by a formerly radical terrorist groupthat had been forced to deal with the realities of governing. If we are serious about the good governance agenda, we have to shift our focus to the reform,reorganization and proper financing of those institutions of the United States government thatactually promote democracy, development and the rule of law around the world, organizations likethe State Department, U.S.A.I.D., the National Endowment for Democracy and the like. The UnitedStates has played an often decisive role in helping along many recent democratic transitions,including in the Philippines in 1986; South Korea and Taiwan in 1987; Chile in 1988; Poland andHungary in 1989; Serbia in 2000; Georgia in 2003; and Ukraine in 2004-5. But the overarchinglesson that emerges from these cases is that the United States does not get to decide when andwhere democracy comes about. By definition, outsiders can't ''impose'' democracy on a countrythat doesn't want it; demand for democracy and reform must be domestic. Democracy promotion istherefore a long-term and opportunistic process that has to await the gradual ripening ofpolitical and economic conditions to be effective. The Bush administration has been walking -- indeed, sprinting -- away from the legacy of itsfirst term, as evidenced by the cautious multilateral approach it has taken toward the nuclearprograms of Iran and North Korea. Condoleezza Rice gave a serious speech in January about''transformational diplomacy'' and has begun an effort to reorganize the nonmilitary side of theforeign-policy establishment, and the National Security Strategy document is being rewritten.All of these are welcome changes, but the legacy of the Bush first-term foreign policy and itsneoconservative supporters has been so polarizing that it is going to be hard to have a reasoneddebate about how to appropriately balance American ideals and interests in the coming years. Thereaction against a flawed policy can be as damaging as the policy itself, and such a reaction isan indulgence we cannot afford, given the critical moment we have arrived at in global politics. Neoconservatism, whatever its complex roots, has become indelibly associated with concepts likecoercive regime change, unilateralism and American hegemony. What is needed now are new ideas,neither neoconservative nor realist, for how America is to relate to the rest of the world --ideas that retain the neoconservative belief in the universality of human rights, but withoutits illusions about the efficacy of American power and hegemony to bring these ends about.